

SYLLABUS
Philosophy 555, TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
An Advanced Introduction
Fall 2018

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Class time: 1.25-3.55 PM Thursdays

Class room: West Duke 204

COURSE CONTENT

We have minds, or maybe it is better to say that (together with our bodies) we are our minds. But how do people or creatures with minds differ from mindless things? What are the marks of the mental? What are intentionality and consciousness, and how are they related? This course provides an advanced introduction to philosophy of mind by surveying several of the main metaphysical theories of mind (e.g., dualism, the mind-brain identity theory, and the representational theory of mind). In doing so, there will be special focus on the nature of consciousness and intentionality.

ASSESSMENT

Class presentation and short paper (2000 word): 20%

Each student will give one short prepared presentation, speaking for (strictly) no more than 10 minutes on a core reading. This presentation is to be written as well as spoken and written version is to be submitted at the start of the class for that week. The written version should be a clear and accurate *summary* of a significant argument offered or discussed in a core reading, along with an explanation of its relevance for whatever central philosophical problem(s) is(are) under discussion that week. If you want, add some brief comments about your own response to it, but assessment is based on how well you seem to understand and can explain the relevant philosophical problem, the argument, and its significance.

Mid-term: 30%

Details to be announced.

Longer term paper: 50% (about 4000 words)

This paper should be your own carefully reasoned and well-developed response to a core reading. Again, focus on a key argument. Summarize that argument at the start, but spend most of your time and space developing your own response to it as best you can. The response could be a criticism of the main argument or a defense of the argument against possible criticisms. This paper is due on December 3rd 2018, by midnight and to be sent by email to carlotta.pavese@duke.edu

TEXT

Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind*, 3rd edition, Westview Press. Please obtain access to a copy. N.B. Graduate students— we recommend you read this highly respected text straight through.

NO PREVIOUS BACKGROUND IN PHIL MIND?

Elliott Sober, *Core Issues in Philosophy* gives a very accessible (1st-year level) introduction.

USEFUL EXTRA RESOURCES

For additional readings, see the lists at the end of each chapter in Kim's text.

For readings on various topics, go to <http://consc.net/mindpapers/>

For surveys and bibliographies, the relevant entries in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (on-line) are generally very good.

All the core and additional readings other than Kim's text will be made available on a Sakai website for the class.

HOW TO PREPARE FOR CLASS

Philosophical issues are richly overlapping, and a good essay is based on a wider understanding of them than can be gained by a week or two's worth of reading. Your term paper will be better (better informed, deeper in its understanding of the views of others and your own, and more able in its critical assessment of the views of others and in support of your own) if you give yourself time spaced out during the semester to absorb and think about the readings. Keep up with the core readings for each week. Read them before class. Don't worry if you don't fully understand them on the first read, but it's important to give them thought before class so that you can benefit from and contribute to the class discussion. The aim of the class is to help you think about the relevant philosophical questions for yourself, in a way that's well-reasoned and also informed by the opinions, insights and reasoning of others.

THE MENTAL & THE PHYSICAL (Aug 30th)

Core Readings:

- Jaegwon Kim (text), Ch. 1., "Varieties of Mental Phenomena," and "Is there a Mark of the Mental?"
- Tuomas K. Pernu, (2017) "The Five Marks of the Mental," *Frontiers in Psychology*, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5500963/>

Further Reading:

- Franz Brentano, "The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena," excerpt in Chalmers (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind, Classical and Contemporary Readings* (479-483).

- Tim Crane, “The Puzzle of Representation,” Ch.2 of *The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation*, 3rd edition (Routledge, 2016).
- Tim Crane, “Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental,” in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
<http://people.exeter.ac.uk/sp344/Intentionality%2520as%2520the%2520mark.pdf>

DUALISM (Sept 6th)

Core Readings:

- Jaegwon Kim (text), Ch.2., “Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes’ Dualism.”
- Karen Bennett, “Why I am Not a Dualist,” at <https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/kb383/whylimnotadualist.pdf>

Further Readings:

- Alyssa Ney. “Defining Physicalism,” in *Philosophy Compass*, (2008): DLE
- Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism” For written and audio presentations, go to <https://apologetics315.com/2009/04/against-materialism-by-alvin-plantinga-mp3-audio/>
- John Foster, “A Defense of Dualism,” <http://www.newdualism.org/papers/J.Foster/Defense-of-Dualism.htm>
- Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” (see too the related readings below).

THE MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY & FUNCTIONALISM (Sept. 13th)

Core Readings:

- Kim (text), Ch. 4, “The Psycho-Neural Identity Thesis.”
- Smart, J.J.C., 1959, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” *Phil. Review*, 68: 141–156.

Further Readings:

- Alyssa Ney, “Reductionism,” in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, at <https://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/>
- Kim (text) Chs. 6. “Causal-Role Functionalism.”
- David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” In Ned Block (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology*. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222 (1980).
- N.J. Block. “Troubles with Functionalism” in Lycan & Prinz, *Mind and Cognition*.

THE REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF MIND (Sept 20th)

Core Readings:

- Barbara Von Eckardt, “The Representational Theory of Mind” (esp. §2.1–§2.5) in In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*. Cambridge University Press (2012)
- Tim Crane, “Computers and Thought.” Ch. 3 in *The Mechanical Mind*.

Further readings:

- Patricia Kitcher: “Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision” (1988)
- Margaret Boden: *AI: Its Nature and Future*, Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Kim (text) Chs.5 “Mind as Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism.”

Sept. 27th. Mid-term

KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT & THE EXPLANATORY GAP (Oct 4th)

Core Reading:

- Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” (in Chalmers ed.)
- Kim text, ch. 10, “Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.”

Further Reading:

- Block, N.J., “Some Concepts of Consciousness,” in David J. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings*. Oxford University Press. pp. 206-218 (2002).
- Lewis, David, “What experience teaches.”
- Horgan, Terence, “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 32: 127–136 (1984). DLE.
- Katalin Balog, “Phenomenal Concepts.”

HIGHER ORDER AND GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (Oct 11th)

Core Reading:

Max Beninger, TBD

Further Readings: TBD

MENTAL CONTENT (Oct.18th)

Core readings:

- Kim (text), Ch.8., “Mental Content.”
- Susan Carey: “The Initial Representational Repertoire” (2009)

Further Reading:

- Daniel Weiskopf, “The Architecture of Higher Cognition” (2014)
- Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of Meaning”
- J.H. Clark Barrett, “On the Functional Origins of Essentialism,” *Mind & Society*, (2001).
- Susan Gelman: “Psychological Essentialism in Children” (2004)

NATURALIZING MENTAL CONTENT (Oct. 25th)

Core readings:

- Tim Crane, the Mechanical Mind, “Explaining Mental Representation,”
- Barry Loewer, “A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics.”

Further Reading:

- Fred Dretske, “Misrepresentation,”
- Jerry Fodor, A Theory of Content, Parts I and II.

- Ruth Millikan, “Biosemantics”
- Karen Neander, “*A Mark of the Mental*,” Ch.7. “The Content Determinacy Challenges.”

THE CONTENTS OF PERCEPTION (Nov 2nd)

Core reading:

- Kevin Lande, “The Perspectival Character of Perception.” *The Journal of Philosophy*, 115(4), 187–214.

Further Reading:

- Kathleen Akins, Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States, *Journal of Philosophy* 93 (7):337 (1996)
- Cohen, J. (2010). "Perception and computation." *Philosophical Issues*, 20:96–124.
- pp. 82–84 of Noë, A. (2004). *Action In Perception*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Secs 3-4 of Tye, M. (1996). "Perceptual experience is a many-layered thing." *Philosophical Issues*, 7:117–126.
- Karen Neander, “*A Mark of the Mental*,” Ch.2.

SKILLS AND MOTION (Nov 9th)

- Carlotta Pavese, “On the Very Idea of Practical Representation.”

Further Reading:

- Millikan, “Pushmi-Pullyu Representations,”
- Burge, “Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes” in Almog & Leonardi *The Philosophy of David Kaplan*.
- Burge, “The Origins of Objectivity” selections.

THE REPRESENTATION OF IMPLICIT BIASES (Nov. 16th)

Core Readings

Guillermo Del Pinal & Shannon Spaulding. “Conceptual centrality and implicit Bias,” *Mind & Language*.

Further Readings

Del Pinal, G., Madva, A., and Reuter, K. (2017), Stereotypes, Conceptual Centrality and Gender Bias: An Empirical Investigation. *Ratio*.
 Brownstein, Michael, "Implicit Bias", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/implicit-bias/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/implicit-bias/).

November 21-25th Thanksgiving Break.

EMOTIONS (Nov 29th)

Jesse Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, Chs.1-3 The intentional structure of emotions.

